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DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRACY
Christopher L. Eisgruber*
I. ONE-DIMENSIONAL DEMOCRACY
A popular account of democracy reduces it to one dimension:
government is democratic if and only if it implements the will of
electoral majorities.! One-dimensional democrats argue about the
relative merits of legislatures and plebiscites. They disagree about
whether democracy requires high levels of citizen participation, or
whether it instead permits citizens to delegate their power to elite
representatives. One-dimensional democrats differ, in short, about
what kinds of electoral majorities are constitutive of democracy. But
one-dimensional democratic theory leaves no doubt about the
importance of such majorities. The democratic credentials of any
government must be measured by reference to a single variable: how
responsive is that government to the decisions of properly constituted
electoral majorities?
Neither judicial review nor constitutionalism fare well under this
test. Judicial review constrains the power of electoral majorities. So
do super-majoritarian barriers to constitutional amendment.
According to one-dimensional democratic theory, these institutions
are presumptively anti-democratic. They suffer, in the famous phrase
of Alexander Bickel, from a "counter-majoritarian difficulty."2
Constitutional theorists have fixated upon this problem for decades.3
Yet, despite its popularity, the one-dimensional account of
democracy has obvious defects. It ignores, for example, the practical
* Director, Program in Law and Public Affairs, and Laurance S. Rockefeller
Professor of Public Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School and the University Center
for Human Values, Princeton University.
1. One-dimensional democracy has a venerable pedigree. It traces back at least
to John Locke, who wrote, "The Majority, having.., the whole power of the
community... may employ all that power in making laws for the community from
time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing: and then
the form of the government is a perfect democracy .... John Locke, The Second
Treatise of Government 73 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., The Liberal Arts Press 1952)
(1690).
2. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics 16 (1962).
3. Important commentaries on this obsession include Rebecca L. Brown,
Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 531 (1998), and Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's
Politics, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 971 (2000).
1723
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
characteristics of mass electorates, which are notoriously non-
deliberative and arguably manipulable. It provides no way to explain
why "majority tyranny" might be undemocratic rather than merely
unjust. It condemns as undemocratic virtually every nation in the
world today, all of which supplement legislatures and elections with
non-majoritarian institutions of various kinds-including not just
constitutional courts and super-majoritarian constitutions but also
central banks and independent agencies.
Jed Rubenfeld and I have written books linked by, among other
things, shared dissatisfaction with the one-dimensional account of
democracy.4 We believe that democracy does not reduce to majority
rule. We believe, more specifically, that "the people" is something
different from (and better than) "an electoral majority," so that
"government by the people" differs in principle from "majority rule."
In our view, a political system that maximizes the power of majorities
may be undemocratic precisely because it is so thoroughly
majoritarian. We also believe that judicial review and inflexible
constitutions, rather than being anti-democratic, may be pro-
democratic precisely because they limit the power of electoral
majorities.
Neither Rubenfeld nor I deny the importance of majoritarian
elections to democratic government. Periodic elections provide
indispensable representations of the people. They provide a kind of
snapshot of public opinion: An election depicts how this particular
people, acting as voters, responded to this specific question (for
example, "Whom do you want for your president-George Bush, Al
Gore, or somebody else?") at this moment. Yet, just as a photograph
yields only a flattened, incomplete representation of a person, so too
an election produces only a flattened, incomplete representation of a
people. That will be true even with regard to a collection of high
quality elections, just as it would be true with regard to an album of
high quality portraits.
There is thus real substance to the similarity of our book titles, both
of which refer to "Constitutional Self-Government."5 Rubenfeld and
I seek, in different though not contradictory ways, to restore missing
dimensions of democracy.6 Rubenfeld's book, Freedom and Time: A
4. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001); Jed
Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government (2001).
5. The two of us might, in principle, have used "constitutional self-government"
in different ways. Walter Murphy, for example, uses "constitutional democracy" to
describe a blend of "constitutionalism and democracy" rather than a form of
democracy. Walter F. Murphy, Alternative Political Systems, in Constitutional Politics:
Essays on Constitution Making, Maintenance and Change 9, 11 (Sotirios A. Barber &
Robert P. George eds., 2001).
6. My distinction between "one-dimensional" and "multi-dimensional"
democratic theory will remind some readers of Bruce Ackerman's distinction
between "monist" and "dualist" democracy. I Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
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Theory of Constitutional Self-Government, emphasizes the dimension
of time. Rubenfeld maintains that for a people to exist and govern
itself freely, it must make durable, generation-spanning commitments.
Perfect sensitivity to the electoral expression of momentary
preferences is undemocratic because it prevents a people from having
and honoring such commitments. My theory, by contrast, emphasizes
dimensions of democracy that exist at a single moment and so might
be called (though only metaphorically) "spatial." I argue in
Constitutional Self-Government that the offices of "legislator" and,
more radically, "voter" carry with them specific incentives that will
skew decision-making about some issues, especially moral issues
related to political justice. I accordingly maintain that a system may
become more democratic by supplementing legislatures and elections
with other institutions that correct these predictable defects.
In Section II of this essay, I explore the challenges that confront
multi-dimensional democratic theory, and then I describe Rubenfeld's
theory and my own. In Section III, I compare the two theories, noting
important overlaps and divergences. In Section IV, I pose some
questions about Rubenfeld's theory. Finally, in Section V, I consider
how Freedom and Time and Constitutional Self-Government fit into
the evolving agenda of constitutional scholarship.
II. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL DEMOCRACY
A. The Challenge of Democracy in Large Polities
In a tiny and virtuous city-state, democracy has a natural form.7 It
involves periodic legislative assemblies in which all citizens
participate. If the city-state is truly virtuous, debates will be inclusive
and respectful. After giving everybody a chance to speak, the citizens
vote. The majority's choice prevails, but, because the citizens respect
one another, the majority's judgment will have been informed by the
views and interests of the minority. No actual polity could live up to
these high standards,' but this form of democracy nevertheless
Foundations 3-10 (1991). The resemblances are real. Ackerman criticizes "monists"
for believing that ordinary elections provide a fully satisfactory representation of the
people. Like Rubenfeld and myself, he seeks a more complex theory that provides a
better representation of the people. His theory, like ours, holds out the promise of a
pro-democratic role for Court and Constitution. Id. at 9-10. On the other hand, it is
arguable that Ackerman's "dualism" still leaves him with a one-dimensional
democratic theory: his theory still centers on the idea that democratic government
must be sensitive to voting majorities of the right kind, although the kind is special
indeed.
7. My account here follows James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the People: Public
Opinion and Democracy 33-34 (1995).
8. Some people suppose that this idealized version of democracy existed in
ancient Athens or New England town meetings, but historians and political scientists
paint a more complex picture of these political systems. Id. at 18-20, 56-67. For an
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constitutes a recognizable ideal. Political theorists refer to it as "face-
to-face democracy."9
Face-to-face democracy has no counterpart in large nation-states.
In a polity the size of the United States (or, for that matter, the size of
Rhode Island, or even the city of Providence), the citizens are too
numerous to assemble, deliberate, and decide as a whole. Making
sense of democracy in modern nation-states is therefore difficult.
Even small polities contain people with differing preferences and
values who disagree sharply. In large polities, people differ from one
another along innumerable dimensions. They have never seen most
of their fellow citizens, much less spoken to them. They may not even
share a language in common. In political battles, some of these
people must win and others must lose. It thus seems obvious that not
all of them can exercise real power-some people will, rather than
making policy, find themselves governed by the policies of their rivals.
Under such circumstances, what can it possibly mean for the whole
people to govern themselves?
One-dimensional democrats sometimes suppose that they have
found a way to extrapolate face-to-face democracy to fit the
circumstances of modern nations. By granting all power to an elected
legislature, a nation retains two attractive features of face-to-face
democracy. Legislative governance preserves the principle of "one
person, one vote," since all citizens get to vote for their legislative
representatives, just as citizens get to vote at town meetings.
Legislative governance also preserves the practice of face-to-face
deliberation. Legislators deliberate before voting, just as citizens
deliberate at town meetings.
These are real virtues. Yet, as James Fishkin has pointed out, these
virtues are not sufficient to make legislative governance a satisfactory
translation of face-to-face democracy."' The problem is simple:
although one-dimensional democracy preserves the elements of
inclusive voting and legislative deliberation, it separates them. The
citizens all vote, but they do not deliberate. One-dimensional
democracy counts upon the legislature to restore the deliberative
character of policy-making, but that solution is flawed. When
legislators reach judgments different from those of voters, they risk
losing their offices. If legislators are to engage in meaningful
deliberation, they must either convince voters to trust them when they
reach results the voters dislike, or they must find a way to educate
voters, so that the voters will embrace the legislators' post-
deliberative conclusions.
empirical analysis of town meetings, see, for example, Joseph F. Zimmerman, The
New England Town Meeting: Democracy in Action (1999).
9. Fishkin, supra note 7, at 4-5.
10. Id. at 5,21-23.
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Unfortunately, large-scale elections generate incentives that make it
very difficult for legislators to do either of these things. Voters are
permitted, if not encouraged, to cast ballots on the basis of their own
self-interest; candidates appeal to them by asking such questions as,
"Are you better off now than you were four years ago?" Moreover,
"voters act in secret; they are not obliged to give reasons for their
vote; they choose among a very limited set of options (such as two or
three candidates for political office, or "yes" or "no" to a ballot
proposition); and each voter's individual ballot has almost zero weight
in determining the outcome of an election."" Under such
circumstances, voters have little incentive to research their decisions
or modify their own preferences out of sensitivity to minority opinion.
Nor do they have any incentive to respect legislative outcomes
inconsistent with their own views. The incentives of mass elections
make "majority tyranny" a serious risk.
One-dimensional democrats suppose that we have no choice but to
live with these problems. We should, of course, try as best we can to
produce a deliberative electorate-by, for example, reforming
campaign finance laws or introducing new systems of representation
(such as some version of proportional representation). If these
solutions do not work, however, one-dimensional democrats believe
there is no coherent alternative to majority rule. They believe that, to
make democracy meaningful in a large nation-state, we must lower
our sights. One-dimensional democrats assume that we must settle for
government by electoral majorities because we cannot attain self-
government by the whole people.
B. Two Paths to Multi-Dimensional Democracy
Rubenfeld and I believe that it is an error to collapse democracy
into a single dimension. We agree that it is possible to give a multi-
dimensional account of democracy that makes the idea of government
by the whole people meaningful in modern, large-scale democracies.
We approach that project in different ways, however. Rubenfeld
analyzes ideas about personhood and agency. He defends the idea
that there exists a collective entity, the whole people, that governs
itself. I examine instead our ideas about democracy. Rather than
seeking to describe a collective agent that governs itself, I search for
criteria that specify what it means for a group of diverse individuals to
govern themselves. I will first sketch Rubenfeld's theory, and then
turn to my own.
11. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Civic Virtue and the Limits of Constitutionalism, 69
Fordham L. Rev. 2131, 2138 (2001).
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1. Democracy Through Collective Commitments
Jed Rubenfeld's Freedom and Time is a profoundly ambitious book.
It develops a theory not just of judicial review but of individual
freedom and personhood. In the course of his argument, Rubenfeld
ventures into diverse domains such as cultural criticism, literary
interpretation, and the paradoxes of social choice theory. Rubenfeld
executes this bold project brilliantly. By virtue of its exceptional
depth and craftsmanship, Freedom and Time rewards careful reading.
Rubenfeld tries to make the idea of democratic self-government
meaningful by arguing "that a people, understood as an agent existing
over time, across generations, is the proper subject of democratic self-
government."' 2  That strategy might seem unpromising. As
Rubenfeld cheerfully concedes, many people suppose that it is just
sloppy to talk about "the people" as though it referred to a real
collective agent. 3 We have already noticed that modern polities are
highly diverse. To make matters worse, the social choice theorems
developed by Kenneth Arrow and others demonstrate that there will
usually be no way to aggregate individual preferences into a coherent
"majority will." 4
Rubenfeld is undaunted by these difficulties. He argues that the
idea of "a people" is no more (and no less!) problematic than the idea
of "a person."' 5 Although most of us are skeptical about the reality of
peoples, we take for granted that we can speak meaningfully about
persons. But why, Rubenfeld asks, is that? Persons, after all,
comprise a bundle of thoughts, memories, preferences, expressions,
and body parts at any given moment. All of these, even body parts,
change over time. It is far from easy to explain how all of these can be
integrated into a single subject.6
According to Rubenfeld, we can resolve these difficulties only by
recognizing a distinctive feature of human freedom. Although people
often talk as though freedom means doing whatever you like at the
moment, nobody actually lives that way. Instead, we construct our
lives around projects-around commitments, to use Rubenfeld's key
term. 7  These commitments may be tiny ("understanding this
paragraph") or a bit larger ("understanding this article") or very
grand ("understanding democracy"). They are, in any event, what
make our lives meaningful. It is (as Rubenfeld rightly suggests)
12. Rubenfeld,supra note 4, at 145.
13. Id. at 146-47, 157.
14. The classic reference is to Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual
Values (2d ed. 1963). Rubenfeld discusses Arrow's Theorem at some length.
Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 103-15.
15. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 157.
16. Rubenfeld's reflections on this problem are set out in Freedom and Time. See
id. at 106-44.
17. Id. at 91-102.
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almost unthinkable to live without commitments for any substantial
period.18 They are constitutive of our freedom: to be a free, self-
governing person is to live by commitments of one's own making.
By conceiving of individual personhood and individual autonomy in
this way, Rubenfeld makes it possible to analogize peoples to persons.
That would be almost impossible if personal freedom consisted of the
liberty to act upon momentary preferences and inclinations. We
would then run smack into Arrow's Theorem and other lessons from
social choice theory, which tell us that it is impossible to aggregate the
preferences of diverse people into a coherent collective inclination.
But matters are different if free persons are defined not by their
capacity to act on preferences but by their ability to make and pursue
commitments:
If... the freedom [to make commitments] is the distinctive human
and political capacity, then it becomes possible to define a political
subject not as any being with a will but as any being with the
capacity to give itself a commitment. In that case, it would be
possible to say not only that persons are political subjects but that
peoples are as well. For a people may have legible principles even if
it does not have a voice or a will.19
This argument provides a way to understand how the people can exist
as a collective agent. The people exists because persons who live
together under law have the capacity to give themselves meaningful
commitments, and this capacity to give and live by commitments is
constitutive of human freedom-of, that is, self-government. 0
Rubenfeld argues that this "commitmentarian" perspective on self-
government provides a ready justification for constitutionalism. If
self-government means making and pursuing durable commitments,
then "[d]emocratic self-government requires an inscriptive politics,
through which a people struggles to memorialize, interpret, and hold
itself to its own foundational commitments over time."21  Written
constitutionalism attempts exactly that, and hence, "constitutionalism
is not counter to democracy. It is required by democracy. 22 Likewise,
judicial review is an important part of democracy so understood
because "the cardinal rule" of commitmentarian self-government is
"that interpretation of commitments cannot be permitted to collapse
into governance by the self's present will. '23 Independent judges can
18. Id. at 96.
19. Id. at 156. I've substituted "make commitments" for Rubenfeld's actual text,
which is "write." The idea of writing plays a complex, partly metaphorical role in
Freedom and Time. See infra note 69.
20. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 153 ("A people, for purposes of democratic self-
government, is the set of persons co-existing under the rule of a particular political-
legal order.").
21. Id. at 163.
22. Id. at 168.
23. Id. at 172.
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hold the people to commitments that they might otherwise disregard,
knowingly or, more likely, unself-consciously, in favor of current will.
Rubenfeld believes that for commitmentarian democracy to
flourish, judicial interpretation of constitutional provisions must adopt
a particular form, which he calls "paradigm case interpretation."24
Paradigm case interpretation presupposes that each constitutional
provision was intended to eliminate some particular evil or else permit
some particular action. The method insists that judges and other
interpreters must honor this core historical intention. They need not,
however, honor all the other intentions and desires the framers had.
In that respect, paradigm case interpretation differs from originalism.
It gives every constitutional provision an historically defined "floor,
but no ceiling."25 As with any other commitment, a constitutional
principle's "full entailments can never be known until they have been
lived out, and lived under, for an extended period of time."26
2. The Complexity of Representative Institutions
Whereas Rubenfeld invokes metaphysical theories about
personhood to explain what it means for the "whole people" to
govern itself, I turn to political theory. Constitutional Self-
Government identifies four goals that make democratic self-
government meaningful without reducing it to majority rule.27
Impartiality demands that the government "respond to the interests
and opinions of all the people, rather than merely serving the
majority, or some other fraction of the people. '' 2' Effective choice
insists that the government "must be able to develop and implement
policies that redress problems its citizens consider significant. ' '2' The
goal of participation requires that "any citizen willing to commit time
and effort should be able to make a meaningful difference in politics
and feel that politics is a rewarding part of her own life." '' Finally, the
criterion of public deliberation entails that democracies "should
encourage citizens to think and converse about basic questions of
justice."'" A political system that satisfies all four of these criteria will
implement government by the whole people, not just a majority, even
though the people are never able to assemble together or govern
themselves in any direct sense.
24. Id. at 178.
25. Id. at 188.
26. Id.
27. My general approach follows Fishkin's, although the set of criteria that he
describes differs from my own. Fishkin, supra note 7, at 33-63.
28. Eisgruber, supra note 4, at 19.
29. Id. at 84.
30. Id. at 85.
31. Id. at 86.
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Elections will be indispensable to any nation that seeks to achieve
this goal. Elections guard against the possibility that the government
will cater to the interests of a powerful elite;32 in that way, elections
promote the value of impartiality. Elections transmit information to
officials about what citizens want, and in that way they promote both
impartiality and effective choice. Elections also provide opportunities
for participation-though these may be quite limited in large-scale
national elections, which are often under the control of elite
politicians and strategists33-and they provide occasions for public
deliberation. For these reasons, any form of democracy-including
those that Rubenfeld and I recommend-will rely heavily on
legislatures and majoritarian elections.
Elections, however, bear only a pragmatic connection to
democracy, not a constitutive one. Elections are desirable institutions
only insofar as they serve democratic goals, and, as we have already
noticed, they will do so only imperfectly. That is not because voters
are unintelligent, amoral, or in some other way incapable of governing
themselves. The problem is that "voter," like "juror" or "legislator,"
is a specific political office embedded in a network of political
institutions. Like all such offices, it carries with it specific incentives.34
The effects of these incentives are especially serious with regard to
moral issues about the relationship of government to the individual.
In order to resolve such issues impartially, a government must honor
moral principles even when those principles protect the interests of
minorities at the expense of the majority." The incentives confronting
voters give them little reason to deliberate about what rights
minorities have against the government or cast their ballot on the
basis of such considerations rather than their own interests.
Accordingly, it is an error to suppose that "government by the
people" is identical to "government by voters." A system that
combines a variety of institutions, some directly sensitive to electoral
pressure and some not, may be more democratic than a system which
relies entirely on institutions and officials who are highly sensitive to
electoral pressure. Constitutional Self-Government justifies the non-
majoritarian features of constitutions in exactly that way. For
32. Id. at 50.
33. Id. at 80-81, 88, 97-98.
34. I described these incentives earlier in this section. See supra text
accompanying note 11. For more extensive discussion, see Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Constitutional Self-Government and Judicial Review: A Reply to Five Critics, 37 U.S.F.
L. Rev. 115 (2002).
35. In Constitutional Self-Government, I offer a more precise characterization of
what impartiality entails with regard to moral issues: "To rule impartially on moral
issues, the government must decide those issues on the basis of moral reasons that
have some popular appeal." Eisgruber, supra note 4, at 57. I do not believe, however,
that my argument for judicial review stands or falls on this particular interpretation of
impartiality. Id. at 72. I have accordingly simplified the account here in the interests
of brevity.
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example, it argues that super-majoritarian amendment rules help to
preserve principles and institutions that make government responsive
to minority as well as majority interests. If constitutions were instead
easily amendable, legislative majorities might consolidate their power
by eliminating such institutions. Super-majoritarian amendment rules
may thus be pro-democratic even though-indeed, precisely because -
they limit the power of majorities.
Constitutional Self-Government treats judicial review in a similar
spirit. It argues that judicial review is best understood as an
ingredient in a complex, non-majoritarian form of democracy, not as a
constraint upon self-government. "In a very simple procedural sense,
judges are representatives of the people."3  They are chosen by
elected officials on the basis of their values and their political views;
they are not chosen by other judges, or by competitive examination,
or by a panel of elite law professors. Of course, federal judges have
life tenure, and that renders them more remote from the people than
most other public officials. Yet, as we have already noticed, a system
that insulates some representatives from electoral pressure may be
more democratic than one in which all officials are subject to direct
electoral control. Life tenure facilitates a particular kind of pro-
democratic function. It enhances the capacity of judges to speak on
behalf of the people about issues of justice; more specifically, it
enables them to resolve moral issues impartially-that is, on the basis
of "reasons that flow from a genuine effort to distinguish between
right and wrong, rather than from self-interest."37
As was the case with Rubenfeld's argument, my justification for
judicial review yields recommendations about how judges should
resolve difficult constitutional questions. My recommendations are
comparatively simple. I do not attempt to provide judges with any
sort of methodological cookbook with which to decide cases. On the
contrary, I suggest that the old interpretive arguments about the
relative importance of philosophy, history, and case law are
overdrawn: "which [argument] works best is probably a matter of
personal style."38 What matters is not so much how judges reason, but
rather what they reason about. Judges ought to acknowledge
forthrightly that the questions confronting them require controversial
moral and political judgments. Judges have long struggled to do just
the opposite: worried that political decision-making by unelected
officials is an embarrassment to democracy, they have tried to justify
their controversial rulings as more or less apolitical exercises of legal
technique, textual hermeneutics, or historical research. That is a
mistake. Judicial review is consistent with democracy because of,
rather than in spite of, its political character; judicial power is
36. Id. at 78.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 8.
1732 [Vol. 71
DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRACY
justifiable because judges are pro-democratic representatives of the
people, not because their professional expertise enables them to
decide political questions in apolitical ways.
It does not follow that judges should exercise their power of judicial
review frequently. Constitutional Self-Government makes a pragmatic
case for judicial review. It defends judicial review on the ground that
it has pro-democratic features that may compensate for the
imperfections of legislatures and electorates. But, of course, judicial
review has imperfections of its own-for example, all judges are
drawn from a single profession;39 they serve long terms that may
attenuate their connection to public opinion and popular judgments
about justice;40 and they have limited tools by which to enforce the
judgments they make.4' It is therefore possible to resist judicial review
on pragmatic grounds, just as I have defended it on such grounds.42 It
is, however, a mistake to suppose, as one-dimensional democrats do,
that judicial review is necessarily undemocratic simply because it
constrains the power of electoral majorities.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
A. Complementary Accounts of Constitutionalism
Rubenfeld and I obviously share much in common. We are united
by our dissatisfaction with one-dimensional democratic theory. We
agree that democracy is something more subtle and more attractive
than simple majority rule. We also believe that if democracy is
properly understood, it becomes possible to defend constitutionalism
and judicial review as pro-democratic institutions. We accordingly
deny that super-majoritarian amendment procedures and
constitutional courts are best understood as constraints upon
democracy; we maintain that they should instead be regarded as
ingredients in a subtle, non-majoritarian form of democracy.
With regard to the most fundamental issues in constitutional theory,
Rubenfeld and I agree more than we disagree. Of course, we also
have important differences. In particular, although we both reject the
one-dimensional account of democracy, we disagree about how to
39. Id. at 67-68.
40. Id. at 66-67.
41. Id. at 76, 173.
42. For a skeptical assessment of the judiciary's capacities, see Mark V. Tushnet,
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 57-65, 129-53 (1999). Of course, a
satisfactory assessment would have to look equally hard at all relevant institutions.
As Martin Flaherty has pointed out, legal scholars have not always honored that
obligation. "Modern constitutional analysis excels at subjecting what courts do to
withering critique .... It provokes somewhat less awe, however, when applied to
the .... ostensibly democratic alternatives to judicial intervention." Martin S.
Flaherty, Constitutional Asymetry, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2073, 2075 (2001).
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restore democracy's other dimensions. Yet even here our theories
complement rather than contradict one another. Indeed, we may to
some extent require one another's accounts, or at least pieces of them,
in order to complete our respective pictures of multi-dimensional
democracy.
For example, my theory focuses on the "spatial" rather than
temporal dimensions of democracy. That is, I emphasize in
Constitutional Self-Government that majoritarian elections and
legislatures provide an incomplete representation of the whole people
at any given moment in time-just as a snapshot provides an
incomplete representation of a whole person at any given moment. I
argue that judges should supplement the efforts of legislators to speak
on behalf of the people about justice, by which I mean they should
attempt to construct the people's current best judgment about justice.
On the other hand, I also maintain that judges may legitimately
appeal to history in order to show that the people's best judgment
about justice is different from the apparent judgment expressed in
opinion polls, elections, or statutes.43 I contend, for example, that
Justice Brandeis's use of history in Whitney v. Californiaa" was
defensible in exactly that way: Brandeis used a selective account of
the founders' opinions about free speech to argue that Americans had
a deep commitment to liberty that was inconsistent with the anti-
communist feeling of his own time." Yet, if the framers' opinions are
to tell us anything about the American people's judgments about
justice in the 1920s, there must be some inter-generational continuity
that makes Americans of the 1920s, in one sense or another, the same
"people" as the Americans who founded the republic. My theory
presupposes such continuity but does not explain it. Rubenfeld's
theory provides one exceptionally sophisticated account of inter-
generational political continuity. His theory of collective
commitments and, more generally, his reflections on the relationship
between time and democracy could help to supply the missing
elements of my own theory.
Conversely, Rubenfeld's temporal extension of democracy may
require something like my account of its "spatial" dimensions. In
particular, Rubenfeld argues that the judiciary is especially well-
positioned to interpret and enforce the people's commitments. He
offers a brief defense of that claim. He says that the people cannot be
trusted to interpret their own commitments because they are prone to
reinterpret their commitments to conform to their present will. "We
all imagine ourselves committed to doing right, or at least to doing no
wrong, and we all find ways to tell ourselves that what we want to do
43. Eisgruber, supra note 4, at 126-27.
44. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
45. Eisgruber, supra note 4, at 128-30.
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here and now conforms to this commitment."46  The people, says
Rubenfeld, ought not to be judges in their own case.47
This justification for judicial review is incomplete at best. After all,
are not judges also tempted to reinterpret commitments to fit their
own present beliefs? That worry is the focal point of most arguments
against judicial review: critics complain that judges will substitute their
own values for those of the people.48 This difficulty seems, if anything,
more acute on Rubenfeld's theory. Rubenfeld emphasizes that our
commitments give us a reason to act independent of whatever other
reasons we have for acting. But other people's commitments
presumably give us no such reason to act-and so, in particular, the
fact that the people have made a commitment gives them a reason to
act, but it does not necessarily give judges any reason to act.
Rubenfeld thus needs a more complex account of why judges are
likely to be faithful to the people's commitments.49 Moreover, his
account will probably have to treat judges as representatives of the
people. Rubenfeld insists that the "full entailments" of a commitment
"can never be known until they have been lived out, and lived under,
for an extended period of time."5 As a result, judicial review is part
of an "ongoing interpretive process by which we live out our
commitments."'" Yet, if judges are not representatives of the people,
it is hard to understand why the commitments fashioned through their
interpretive choices should count as our commitments. By delegating
the interpretation and enforcement functions to a third-party, the
people might increase the likelihood that they will be faithful to the
46. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 172.
47. Id.
48. For an important recent statement of this critique, see Jeremy Waldron, Law
and Disagreement 296-98 (1999). Rubenfeld admits that judges may experience a
conflict of interest when their own powers are at stake. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at
173-74. But the problem is not so limited. Judges will compromise the people's
commitments if they bend those commitments to fit current conceptions (or the
judge's own conceptions) of justice. Rubenfeld needs to explain why we should trust
judges to enforce the people's commitments, just as I must explain why we should
trust judges to speak on behalf of the people. Both Rubenfeld and I must, in other
words, rebut the claim that judges will use their constitutional authority to advance
their own beliefs and values rather than anything (be it a commitment or a conception
of justice) that can be called the people's.
49. Rubenfeld seems to say that judges will be more faithful to the people's
commitments than will be the people themselves. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 172
("Referring questions of constitutional interpretation to majority will would make the
present citizens judges in their own case .... " (emphasis added)). For reasons
explained in the text, that seems to me an error. It would be better for Rubenfeld to
say that judges will be more faithful to the people's commitments than would be other
available institutions, such as the legislature or the electorate. The electorate is not
the same as the citizens, and Rubenfeld has not supplied any reason why judges
should be regarded as more trustworthy than other citizens (if we are really talking
about citizens rather than, say, voters).
50. Id. at 188.
51. Id. at 189 (emphasis added).
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commitments they once made, but only at the cost of surrendering
involvement in the creative "ongoing interpretive process" that is
crucial to having and living by commitments. The exclusion of the
people from that process would seem to be a significant loss from the
standpoint of democracy. Some theorists might simply say that the
people are better off if they accept this loss in order to secure better
enforcement of their commitments. But such a position is probably
unavailable to Rubenfeld, who does not recognize any tension
between judicial review and democracy.
I accordingly believe that Rubenfeld will ultimately have to claim,
as I do, that judges are representatives of the people. Of course, he
need not endorse my particular argument for that proposition. But it
seems likely that what I say about it will be useful to Rubenfeld, just
as what he says about commitments and inter-generational continuity
will be useful to me.
B. Pragmatic and Foundational Justifications for Constitutional
Institutions
Though we have thus far concentrated on the similarities between
Rubenfeld's theory and my own, there are also important differences.
Some are readily apparent. For example, Rubenfeld argues that
democracy is about the agency and actions of a collective entity, "the
people." My theory assumes that democracy is about making
government responsive to the needs, actions, and judgment of
individual citizens. Rubenfeld believes that the point of
constitutionalism is to hold people to past commitments, even when
those commitments are inconsistent with their present will. I believe
that the point of constitutionalism is to enable the people to govern
themselves on the basis of their best current judgments about justice,
morality, and other matters. These differences lead to competing
interpretive protocols. Rubenfeld insists on what he calls "paradigm
case interpretation" in order to prevent constitutional commitments
from coinciding with current moral judgments. I call upon judges to
treat the Constitution's abstract, liberty-regarding provisions as
references to moral ideals, and I urge them to construct the people's
best current moral judgment about what those provisions require.
I want now to identify an additional point of distinction which,
though less obvious, is equally fundamental. Rubenfeld fastens a rigid
conceptual connection between democracy, constitutionalism, and
judicial review. He claims, in particular, that once we understand the
meaning of freedom and democracy, we will see that constitutionalism
and judicial review are indispensable to their attainment. According
to Rubenfeld, freedom and democracy are attainable only through the
entrenchment of durable commitments over time and, he argues, that
is precisely what constitutionalism does and what constitutionalism
alone can do. "[C]onstitutionalism is not counter to democracy. It is
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required by democracy."52 And "written constitutionalism ... cannot
exist without judicial review. 5 3 It would seem to follow that no
society can be fully free and democratic unless it has a written
constitution and judicial review.
My theory, by contrast, regards the connection between judicial
review, constitutionalism, and democracy as pragmatic rather than
conceptual. I argue that judicial review and constitutionalism are
useful institutions that societies may harness to secure impartiality or
other goals that are essential to democracy. I do not, however, argue
that judicial review and constitutionalism are themselves essential to
democracy. Nor do I contend that these institutions are the only ones
that can successfully implement democratic goals, or that they will do
so infallibly, or that they will do so better than any imaginable
alternatives. On the contrary, I suggest that many different
institutional arrangements might serve the goals of democracy. 4 For
example, strong political parties might render elected officials less
beholden to voters and so provide an alternative means by which to
compensate for the deficiencies of mass elections. A political system
that fostered strong parties might therefore have less need for judicial
review than does the United States, where parties are weak.5
This treatment of political institutions conforms to an approach
pioneered within constitutional theory by Lawrence G. Sager, who has
emphasized the existence of a "strategic gap" between ideals and
institutions.56 Although Sager and I insist that the assessment of
constitutional institutions should have a pragmatic, partly empirical
component, neither of us believes that the analysis of political
institutions should reduce to ad hoc evaluation of "what works." Any
constitutional theory must tackle moral questions about the meaning
of democracy and justice, or else it will have no metric by which to say
which results count as "working" and which as "broken." But once
we have these moral criteria, I believe, with Sager and against
Rubenfeld, that there will be a second stage of inquiry in which we
must consider the actual performance of institutions and ask which
best satisfy whatever criteria we have embraced. It is entirely
possible-perhaps even likely-that this second stage will yield a
variety of solutions. There may be multiple institutional
arrangements equally well-suited to produce impartial governance, or,
52. Id. at 168.
53. Id. at 172.
54. Eisgruber, supra note 4, at 9, 21-22, 75-76.
55. Id. at 76-77.
56. Sager has pursued this theme in several articles. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager,
The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893, 944-45 (1990) ("The extrinsic
linkage between a ground and procedure of choice necessarily is pragmatic rather
than conceptual. The pragmatic arguments in favor of such a linkage inevitably will
be soft, roughly probabilistic, and heavily tinged with local institutional
experience....").
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alternatively, different arrangements may promote impartiality in
different circumstances. For that reason, my argument in
Constitutional Self-Government attempts only to show that the judicial
review and super-majoritarian constitutions are best regarded as pro-
democratic devices. I do not argue, and I do not believe, that they are
essential or indispensable to democracy.
Because Rubenfeld attempts to forge conceptual (rather than
pragmatic) links among constitutionalism, judicial review, and
democracy, his theory becomes exceptionally demanding in two
different respects. First, the theory cannot be tolerant of political
systems that diverge far from the American model. If, as Rubenfeld
says, democracy requires constitutionalism, then we must condemn
governments like the British one as undemocratic, even though most
people regard Britain as a paradigmatic example of democratic
government. Rubenfeld is thus in much the same boat as the one-
dimensional democrats, who must condemn governments as
undemocratic if they diverge from the British model. In my view, the
idea that democracy always and invariably requires written
constitutions and judicial review is no more attractive than the idea
that democracy always and invariably requires complete legislative
supremacy. Neither idea can account for the diverse institutional
schemes employed by modern democracies."
Second, the theory can succeed only if it specifies moral goods that
are always and uniquely served by constitutionalism and judicial
review. That condition is difficult to satisfy. Most institutions bear
only a pragmatic relationship to the moral ideals they serve. For
example, American criminal procedure is one (imperfect) attempt to
give defendants a fair trial. It would be unreasonable, however, to
claim that the American system is the only way to provide a fair
trial-and that is so even if we focus entirely upon basic,
constitutionally secured aspects of American criminal procedure, such
as the right to a jury trial. For Rubenfeld to connect ideals
conceptually rather than pragmatically, the ideals he specifies must be
highly refined-they must match particular institutions so closely that
ideals and institutions become inseparable from one another. In my
view, the pressure to meet these requirements gives Rubenfeld's
theory a rather exotic shape.
57. The theory also limits the institutional flexibility of the American
constitutional system. For example, because Rubenfeld forges a rigid, conceptual link
between written constitutionalism and judicial review, he may have to reject the
widespread view that some constitutional guarantees should be "judicially
underenforced." The seminal discussion of that point is Sager's: Lawrence Gene
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
Harv. L. Rev. 1212,1213 (1978). An important recent discussion is James E. Fleming,
Fidelity, Basic Liberties, and the Specter of Lochner, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 147
(1999) (discussing underenforcement of economic rights).
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One might say, then, that Rubenfeld's theory is narrow on both
ends. Its theoretical foundations depend upon a very specific account
of personhood. Its practical applications suggest that any country
without a written constitution and judicial review is undemocratic. I
find these features of Rubenfeld's theory troubling, and in the next
section I raise some questions about them.
IV. FOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT COMMITMENTS
In this section, I develop four questions about commitments and
their relationship to constitutionalism. All of the questions are
framed in a way consistent with some key elements of Rubenfeld's
theory. In particular, they do not challenge his claim that "peoples"
exist as collective agents or his claim that commitments are important
to self-government. My questions are designed to probe how
commitments matter to peoples. One possibility is that commitments
are valuable and pro-democratic only insofar as they facilitate a
people's efforts to govern itself on the basis of its best current
judgments about justice." At times Rubenfeld seems ready to
endorse this view. He says, for example, that "[c]onstitutionalism...
contemplates a nation pursuing justice and freedom by honoring its
own higher law"59 and that a person cannot genuinely hold a
commitment unless he retains "a kind of belief in [its] rightness."60
For the most part, however, the connection between justice and
commitment does not figure prominently in his account. Moreover, as
we shall see, he sometimes suggests that fidelity to past decisions
might be valuable for its own sake, even if we now suspect that those
decisions were unjust or unwise.
A. What Are Commitments?
Rubenfeld rightly believes that moral and political theorists have
paid too little attention to the role of commitments in our ethical life,
and his thoughtful study will be valuable to anybody interested in the
topic. Rubenfeld's understanding of commitments has, however, a
peculiar feature. He maintains, in effect, that commitments are
valuable for their own sake. If we carry on with our projects only
because we "think it best, here and now, to do so,"61 then we do not
have a genuine commitment to them. According to Rubenfeld,
commitments give us a "weighty reason, in the nature of an
obligation" to continue forward with something even when we "have
58. Cf Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means 60 (1984) ("[T]he
Constitution's ways must constitute our best conception of the good society in order
for us to make sense of the Constitution as supreme law.").
59. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 177.
60. Id. at 127.
61. Id. at 101.
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no independent reason to do this thing" and when it will neither
"inure to [our] benefit in any way" nor "make anyone else better
off.
62
These robust claims set Rubenfeld's position apart from an
alternative theory that regards commitments as strategic devices for
the pursuit of other, more basic goals.63 For example, Lori might
commit herself to practice the piano for an hour each evening because
she feared that without such a strict regimen, she would never practice
at all. It seems plausible that the value of her commitment would turn
entirely upon whether it helped her to learn the piano and upon
whether she continued to desire to learn. If the commitment were not
useful in that way, it would not give her any independent reason to
act.
It is a delicate question whether commitments are only strategic
devices for the attainment of other goals or whether, as Rubenfeld
argues, they have independent normative force. The answer may
depend upon the commitment. Rubenfeld's key examples often
involve loving attachments to particular persons. He discusses, for
example, the commitment to marry somebody,' or to have a child,65
or to fulfill a dying friend's last wish.6 It is not obvious that these
commitments are typical of those made by peoples and governments.
Nobody is obliged to fall in love with anybody, much less anybody in
particular. By contrast, persons and peoples may indeed be obliged to
commit themselves to the pursuit of justice. It seems possible that in
the latter case the commitment should be regarded as entirely
subordinate to the pre-existing end (that is, to justice).
If commitments had only an instrumental relationship to
democracy, freedom, and other values, then constitutionalism would
likewise have only instrumental value to those more basic goals. The
value of constitutionalism would turn upon the likelihood that
constitutional processes would produce good commitments rather
than bad ones. The virtues of super-majoritarian amendment
procedures would then have to be traded off against their vices: an
inflexible constitution might increase the likelihood that a people
would honor commitments made in the past, but it would also limit
their power to revise mistaken commitments. In general,
62. Id. at 101-02. This aspect of Rubenfeld's theory seems analogous to Ronald
Dworkin's insistence that "integrity" is an independent political value. Ronald
Dworkin, Law's Empire 164-67, 176-78, 184 (1986). Rubenfeld does not, so far as I
can tell, remark on this interesting overlap with Dworkin's theory; he treats Dworkin
(somewhat inaccurately) as an advocate for "a-prioristic reasoning about the nature
of democracy" and other moral issues. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 82.
63. Rubenfeld considers this alternative and rejects it. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at
94-95, 117-30, 143-44.
64. Id. at 108-14.
65. Id. at 189.
66. Id. at 101-02.
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constitutionalism would require a pragmatic defense of the sort that
Sager and I try to provide, rather than a conceptual one.
Perhaps Rubenfeld would agree with that conclusion. After all, he
cannot possibly believe that a people is always better off simply
because it has constitutional commitments, regardless of their content.
On the other hand, he might believe that a people is always more
democratic if it has an entrenched constitution than if it does not, just
as the one-dimensional democrats believe that a country is inevitably
more democratic if it is more responsive to the will of electoral
majorities. Rubenfeld could then say, just as the one-dimensional
democrats do, that democracy is no guarantee of good results: a self-
governing people may govern itself badly, producing bad
commitments and bad laws. In any event, if Rubenfeld believes that
the pro-democratic character of constitutional commitments is in any
way contingent upon their relationship to justice or other moral
values, he does not say so.
B. Why Must Commitments Be Constitutional?
Rubenfeld believes, plausibly enough, that constitutions can be
defended on the ground that they are good mechanisms for making
commitments. Yet, Rubenfeld in fact claims something much stronger
on behalf of constitutionalism. In a striking line that I quoted earlier,
he claims that "constitutionalism... is required by democracy."6 I do
not understand why that is so. Why must a nation have a constitution
in order to make and honor commitments? Why don't ordinary
statutes suffice? Rubenfeld insists that a nation's commitments must
be inscribed so that they can persist over time.68 Yet, statutes seem to
satisfy this test: they are written,69 and most have a long lifetime. No
nation revises all its statutes constantly, and, indeed, no nation could
do so-a point that Rubenfeld himself makes quite effectively.
Of course, statutes are fully revisable in principle, so a people can
escape statutory commitments more easily than constitutional ones.
But why should that be a problem? Rubenfeld maintains that
commitments must be revisable, and he accordingly insists that
67. Id. at 168.
68. See, e.g., id. at 97, 173.
69. The distinction- between speech and writing figures heavily in Freedom and
Time, but in a sense that is ultimately more figurative than literal. Rubenfeld calls for
self-government on the model of writing... [n]ot because there is a
necessity for a literal writing, but because temporally extended self-
government is available only to beings who have what I call the freedom to
write-who can communicate with themselves over time, who can give
themselves texts, including legal texts, to govern their futures.
id. at 88; see also id. at 97. Rubenfeld's emphasis on the Constitution's writtenness is
reminiscent of another profoundly thoughtful book about the Constitution, William
F. Harris II, The Interpretable Constitution (1993).
70. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 75-86.
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constitutions must be amendable. The difference between
constitutions and statutes would therefore appear to be one of degree
rather than kind- and this difference in degree becomes much less
significant if we shift attention from the exceptionally rigid American
constitution to others around the world, most of which are much more
flexible. Moreover, the personal commitments we give to ourselves as
individuals are, in general, freely revisable. Because Rubenfeld's
account of democratic self-government parallels his analysis of
individual self-government, it is not clear why the commitments of
peoples must be entrenched through a written constitution when the
commitments of persons are not.
I cannot help but wish that Rubenfeld had said more about
Britain.7' The British have no written constitution, but their
government is one of the most stable in the world. Would Rubenfeld
want to say that the British people have no commitments? Would he
want to say that they are worse off in this regard than, for example,
the French, who have a written constitution-and, indeed, have had
several? And what about constitutions such as those in some
American states, which are freely amendable by majority vote? Do
these count? What about Israel, which now has a flourishing tradition
of judicial review without a written constitution?
I am sure that Rubenfeld has answers to these questions, but his
position is difficult. If he concedes that Britain or Israel counts as a
commitmentarian democracy, then his position will be plausible to a
greater number of readers. But his defense of constitutionalism would
be incomplete, since a nation could have commitmentarian democracy
with or without a constitution. To finish his argument, he would have
to provide arguments about why entrenched commitments produced
greater net benefits than revisable ones-and that sounds, again, like
the kind of pragmatic argument that Sager and I regard as necessary.
If, on the other hand, he denied that Britain or Israel counted, he
would find himself with an idiosyncratic evaluation of the world's
governments, and he would have to narrow his moral theory still
further to explain why only entrenched commitments could suffice to
make a people self-governing.
C. Why Must Constitutions Be Commitmentarian?
The last subsection inquired whether a people might have
commitments without a constitution. This subsection flips the
question and asks whether a people might have a constitution without
having commitments (in Rubenfeld's sense of that term). Rubenfeld
seems to suppose that the whole point of written constitutions is to
make commitmentarian democracy possible. He hales the American
71. He mentions Britain briefly in a way that suggests he does not regard it as fully
democratic. Id. at 164.
1742 [Vol. 71
DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRACY
founding as the first expression of a new form of democracy.72 Yet,
Rubenfeld's commitmentarian theory hardly seems necessary, or even
apt, to explain what happened in Philadelphia in 1787. If one is
forming a new democratic government for a large country, what is the
alternative to a written constitution? Whenever a group of people is
forming a new organization, it is useful, and often necessary, to specify
its structure in writing. It is a bit grandiose, if not mystical, to claim
that this structural blueprint "gather[s] up generation upon generation
of Americans into a single political subject," or that it is "a means by
which a people re-collects itself and its fundamental commitments.
73
I am not sure whether Rubenfeld would regard an almost purely
structural Constitution-such as the American one prior to adoption
of the Bill of Rights-as sufficient to establish what he calls
"commitmentarian democracy." Perhaps he would. Rubenfeld says,
for example, that "[e]very grant of power to Congress-for example,
the power to regulate commerce among the states-is a kind of
commitment to permit. '74 Apparently, then, the structural provisions
of the Constitution count as "commitments" in the sense that matters
to Rubenfeld. On the other hand, when Rubenfeld refers to the
Constitution, he often seems to have in mind not the original,
structural Constitution, but its liberty-regarding supplements, such
as the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. He
occasionally writes, for example, of "commitments" and "principles"
as though they were interchangeable.7 5 That focus is understandable:
the struggle to interpret and honor the First Amendment seems more
fundamental to the identity of the American people than the
president's power to veto legislation. Moreover, even if the practical
exigencies of establishing a new government suffice to explain the
need for a written constitution, they do not explain the need for a Bill
of Rights.76  Commitmentarian logic may accordingly be more
applicable to the Bill of Rights than to the structural Constitution.
We might pursue this discrimination among clauses a bit further.
Suppose we agreed with Rubenfeld that commitments are essential to
self-government and that commitments must be constitutional in
character. Even then, it would not follow that all constitutional
provisions must state commitments. Some constitutional rights might
be fundamental commitments of the American people while others
were not. We might count, for example, the Free Speech Clause as a
commitment that defines the American people while denying such
72. Id. at 164-65. "American written constitutionalism... stood for something
radically new: a democratic effort by a people to write down and live up to its own
foundational commitments over time." Id. at 43.
73. Id. at 177.
74. Id. at 185.
75. Id. at 156-57.
76. Eisgruber, supra note 4, at 38-39.
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status to the Third Amendment or (more controversially) the Second
Amendment.
This approach might save Rubenfeld some trouble, because, as I
shall explain in the next subsection, his interpretive methodology
yields uncomfortable results when applied to some constitutional
clauses. I have the impression, though, that Rubenfeld would be
unhappy with the suggestion: he seems to suppose that constitutions
must be pervasively commitmentarian in order to be democratic. Yet,
if I am correct to attribute that view to him, I am not sure why he
holds it. As long as a people has some constitutionally inscribed
commitments, the demands of commitmentarian democracy appear to
be satisfied. Perhaps judges (and other interpreters) will encounter
practical difficulties in deciding which provisions count as
commitments-but I suspect, as I have already hinted, that there are
countervailing practical benefits to a distinction that separates
commitmentarian from non-commitmentarian constitutional
provisions.
D. Should We Be Attracted to Paradigm Case Interpretation?
As I have already said, Rubenfeld recommends a particular
interpretive protocol, which he labels "paradigm case interpretation."
According to that protocol, judges and other constitutional
interpreters must construe constitutional provisions so to preserve the
"[c]ore historical applications"77 which motivated the "act of
constitution-writing" that produced the provision." For example, the
"struggle to abolish" the black codes in the South motivated
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment; hence, any valid
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause must hold such codes to
be unconstitutional.79 Rubenfeld says that the paradigm case method
is the only way that judges can treat "the Constitution's provisions ...
in terms of the actual, historical struggles of a particular people to lay
down and live out its own commitments. 8 '
Again, I do not understand why that is so. Consider the following
example, adapted from one that I use in Constitutional Self-
Government.8 Sonny, who is nineteen years old, straggles home after
midnight and heads for the refrigerator. Famished, he pulls out some
raw fish and wine; he is too tired to cook, so he begins to eat. Grampa
walks into the kitchen and is shocked. "Raw fish and wine will make
you sick. Promise me this, Sonny: You will never again eat such
unhealthy foods!" Sonny, ashamed of himself, makes a commitment
77. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 187.
78. Id. at 182.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 183.
81. Eisgruber, supra note 4, at 29-32.
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never to eat unhealthy foods. The commitment is motivated by his
concern that, however hungry he might have been, raw fish and wine
were bad for his health.
Years pass and medical science produces results showing that, in
fact, sushi and wine can be good for you. Sonny must now decide how
to interpret his commitment. We can argue about whether, in the end,
he should eat or refuse sushi. But it would be an error to suppose that
his commitment becomes meaningless unless he avoids raw fish. Even
though the commitment was motivated by a particular historical
episode-eating raw fish at midnight-Sonny's actual commitment
said nothing about fish. It referred instead to a more general idea
("unhealthy food") which has real meaning apart from the incident
that provoked its use.
There are various tricks that could reconcile this point with the
paradigm case method. One might say, for example, that the
paradigm case for Sonny's commitment is not the eating of raw fish,
but the eating of raw fish pulled from the refrigerator late at night, or
the eating of raw fish without benefit of scientific studies showing it to
be healthy, and so on. But if Rubenfeld were to go down that path,
his paradigm cases would do no work at all; it would always be
possible to come up with a morally relevant difference (we understand
things differently now than they did then) that would enable later
interpreters to escape from problematic cases that motivated the
adoption of a particular constitutional provision.
It is possible that when people enact abstract constitutional
provisions, they mean to commit themselves to the best interpretation
of the principle expressed therein, not to any particular application of
it. They would, of course, never expect that the best interpretation of
the principle would be inconsistent with the historical applications
that motivated them to embrace the principle in the first place. But to
say that they do not expect this result is not to say that they rule it out
as impossible-they might simply regard it as extremely improbable.
Usually, these expectations will be well justified. What seemed an
injustice when a constitutional provision was ratified will also seem
unjust to later generations. And, in fact, Rubenfeld's examples of
paradigm case interpretation are quite benign from the perspective of
modern liberal political theory. He argues that under his preferred
methodology, segregated schools are unconstitutional;82  sex
discrimination is also unconstitutional;83 and affirmative action plans
are constitutionally permissible.84 He also argues that there are
unwritten constitutional rights to contraception, abortion and
homosexual intimacy. 5
82. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 192-94.
83. Id. at 196-201.
84. Id. at 201-20.
85. Id. at 247-53.
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There is something ironic about this string of examples, because
Rubenfeld claims that the "cardinal rule" for the interpretation of
commitments is that they "cannot be permitted to collapse into
governance by the self's present will. '8 6 The examples seem to
produce a constitution surprisingly consistent with the "present will"
of liberal constitutional theorists. Yet, if paradigm case interpretation
matters at all, it will matter when it binds us to "core historical
applications" that now seem unattractive, or when it prevents us from
extending a principle to embrace other applications that now seem
desirable. It is not difficult to find examples. Rubenfeld might have
analyzed the Second Amendment. Likewise, he might have taken up
the Contracts Clause; in fact, Justice Sutherland stood on firm ground
when he declared that debtor relief laws, like the one at issue in Home
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,"7 were precisely the evil
that prompted adoption of the Contracts Clause. Does Rubenfeld
believe that Blaisdell was wrongly decided? And if so, does he believe
that it has significant applications today, or is he inclined to provide a
limiting construction that confines it to a small number of cases (in
which case, for better or worse, Rubenfeld will once again have
reconciled the Constitution to present will)?
I would, of course, have no objection if Rubenfeld were able to
endorse the modern, toothless interpretation of the Contracts Clause.
I regard it as perverse to struggle to produce interpretations of the
Constitution that are inconsistent with our best judgments about
justice." More generally, I believe that the Constitution and judicial
review are best justified on the ground that they help the people to
govern on the basis of their best judgments about justice. 9 Yet, in his
account of paradigm case interpretation and elsewhere in his theory,
Rubenfeld seems to take a different view. He seems to suppose that
the Constitution is valuable and pro-democratic precisely because it
sometimes allows past decisions to trump present judgments about
justice. In the end, I am not sure whether I am correct to believe that
Rubenfeld's view has this feature, but, if it does, it is an unfortunate
and unappealing aspect of an otherwise rich and admirable theory.
V. THE NEXT GENERATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY?
DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD TODAY
John Hart Ely's classic study of judicial review included a classic
statement of one-dimensional democratic theory. "[T]he choosing of
values is a prerogative approrpriately left to the majority,"9"' wrote
86. Id. at 172.
87. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
88. Eisgruber, supra note 4, at 130.
89. See id. at 206.
90. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 179
(1980).
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Ely. Ely published that line, and the book containing it, in 1980. At
the time, one-dimensional democracy had at least one thing to be said
in its favor: it seemed roughly consistent with the structure of most
free governments in the world. To be sure, the United States was not
the only nation with a thriving tradition of judicial review-Ireland,
the Federal Republic of Germany, and India all had active
constitutional courts. But these countries seemed exceptional, and it
was still possible to treat the parliamentary model as a kind of
international norm.
More than two decades have now passed, and how the world has
changed! Nations all over the world have embraced judicial review in
one form or another, prompting Vernon Bogdanor, a political scientist
at Oxford University, to write that the British parliamentary system
"has become a warning of what to avoid. In the 1990s, not one of the
new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe contemplated
adopting the British system."'" Thanks partly to the effects of the
European Union, even Britain now has judicial review.92
Constitutional theory accordingly faces a new challenge. It no
longer needs to apologize for America's anomalous departure from
legislative supremacy. Instead, its most urgent task is to account for
the wide variety of institutions that modern nation states have
harnessed to democratic goals. Constitutional theory must, in other
words, restore the dimensions of democracy that have for so long
been absent from American constitutional scholarship. Rubenfeld
and I are not the first to push in that direction, nor will we be the last.
I believe, though, that we are pursuing the right questions, and I am
confident that Rubenfeld's book, at least, has made a significant
contribution to the debate; I hope the same is true of Constitutional
Self- Government.
91. Vernon Bogdanor, Power and the People: A Guide to Constitutional Reform
11(1997).
92. Eisgruber, supra note 4, at 77.
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